There is a melancholy irony in the fact that Louis Althusser, a thinker much castigated in his own time for the abstract character of his Marxism, should have consigned his most pellucid reflections on the practical roots of abstraction to a manual of sorts that would never reach its imagined "popular" audience. Expertly edited by G. M. Goshgarian and insightfully introduced by Guillaume Sibertin-Blanc, Initiation à la philosophie pour les non-philosophes (1978, published in 2014) belongs to a series of book-length manuscripts unpublished in Althusser's lifetime.
1 As we learn from Goshgarian's editorial notes, it is an integral redrafting of Être marxiste en philosophie (1976, published in 2015) , which in turn can be regarded as the virtual second tome of Sur la reproduction (now published in English as On the Reproduction of Capitalism). That book had employed Althusser's cherished image of the "detour" to explicate how correctly posing the question "What is philosophy?" from a Marxist standpoint necessarily required reconstructing a historical-materialist theory of ideology within which idealist philosophy could find its place and materialist philosophy its point of attack. The paradoxes and fetters of Althusser's own philosophical practice are evident in the fact that what went unpublished were not abstruse speculative works or private aphorisms but didactic theoretical and political interventions, which include some of the French thinker's most limpid as well as most playful prose.
2 Their publication today, besides suggesting revisions to our image of Althusser, to how we periodize that inveterate periodizer, inserts itself into a vastly different political and intellectual conjuncture, one in which debates about the nature of abstraction intersect with a partial resurgence in Marxist theorizing.
Initiation à la philosophie pour les non-philosophes is particularly welcome in this regard as Althusser's most explicit and exhaustive engagement with the question of abstraction, understood as one that may ultimately define what it means, to use a somewhat obsessive formulation of his, to be a Marxist in philosophy. The elaboration of a materialist Marxist theory of abstraction had been broached in the period of so-called high Althusserianism, most prominently with the extrapolation in For Marx of a theory of the production of knowledge from Marx's 1857 "notes on method," 3 under the rubric of "Generalities," though perhaps most promisingly in that compact gem that is "Cremonini, Painter of the Abstract."
4 Initiation, in conjunction with Sur la reproduction and Être marxiste en philosophie, registers the transformations undergone by Althusser's treatment of abstraction in the wake of those self-criticisms that took his own theoreticism as their putative target. It also allows us to correct a one-dimensional estimation of Althusser's "Leninist" turn, namely by demonstrating that his increasing politicization of philosophical activity went hand in hand with a greater centrality accorded to abstraction, not a crude reduction to political expediency. Indeed, the elaboration of a many-sided Marxist account of abstraction will turn out to be decisive in redefining the agonistic image of philosophy-divided, in a veritable stásis, or civil war, between idealism and materialism, and conditioned by the exigencies of class struggle-which preoccupied Althusser at least ever since " Lenin and Philosophy." In what follows, I want to explore the complex picture of abstraction that emerges from Initiation (read alongside Sur la reproduction and Être marxiste), and sketch how Althusser employs it to address what it means to be a Marxist in philosophy from a series of interlocking angles, which include: the relation between (theoretical) abstraction and (concrete) practice; the status of the human being as an "ideological animal"; the question of philosophy's origins or beginnings; the articulation between philosophy and ideology, especially juridical ideology; the role of non-philosophy; and finally the affinity between a materialist practice of philosophy, or "counter-philosophy," and the transition to communism. The aim of this exercise is not an antiquarian or philological one. Instead, we need to test whether Althusser's theses and categories of abstraction (unlike Gilles Deleuze, Althusser insists that philosophy does not produce concepts) can contribute to a contemporary elucidation of a historical-materialist theory of abstraction. In keeping with this aim, and in order better to delineate the place of abstraction in Initiation, my reconstruction will not follow the order of presentation in Althusser's manuscript.
At the core of Initiation is the suggestion that abstraction is an inextricable element or condition of all human practices. In keeping with Hegel's pioneering dialectical insights in the sense-certainty chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit, the most seemingly immediate concrete fact is predicated on the selective focus on a particular experience by means of the addition of a generalizing term (in Hegel: "this"). Faithful to his rationalist convictions, Althusser rejects the vulgar vitalist and empiricist premise according to which, in subtracting from the immeasurable wealth of reality, abstraction is fundamentally impoverishing. 5 On the contrary, approaching abstraction as a practical activity that is consubstantial with human action-in other words, envisaging abstraction from a non-philosophical vantage-means conceiving it as productive of reality. Not only, as Althusser will incessantly stress, are all practices reliant on those operative abstractions that he terms "practical ideologies," but human action itself is predicated on forms of practical knowledge that form the everyday milieu for seemingly "higher" abstractive activities and forms. There is no practice without abstraction. In Althusser's formulation, "every specific practice (labor, scientific research, medicine, political struggle) abstracts from the rest of reality in order to concentrate on transforming a part of reality. To abstract is 'to detach' a part of reality from the rest of it. Abstraction is, to begin with, this operation, and its result. The abstract is opposed to the concrete as the part detached from the whole is opposed to the whole" (105-6). Orthodox materialist observance-one must approach abstraction on the basis of the practical activity carried out by the masses, by human beings at large-is combined with a position dead set against the empiricist rot at the heart of dialectical materialism, which would delude us into thinking that it is possible to derive thought from nonabstract material activity. But practice-which Althusser defines as a social process engaging in an active relation to the real 6 -is synonymous with practical abstraction. Or rather, in a critical and anti-idealist correction of a philosophy of praxis-in-the-singular, the irreducible plurality of human practices is accompanied by a correlated plurality of regimes of (practical) abstraction. 7 In a felicitous formulation, Althusser declares that "there also exists an infinite number of abstract gestures that are bound up with concrete practices yet exist independently of them, and this enables them to have general value and serve these concrete practices" (119).
It belongs to the thorniness of the problems raised by Althusser's initiation to abstraction that, in order the better to establish the plural articulation of practices and their respective regimes of abstraction, he ventures into the perilous terrain of philosophical anthropology. Firstly, he chases abstraction all the way into the nature of language itself, which demonstrates in an exemplary manner the additive character of abstraction. Following Ferdinand de Saussure, Althusser stresses that language's force of abstraction lies in its arbitrariness, its addition to the material world of abstract, and yet terribly active, signifiers. It is the abstraction of language that "serves to designate the most concrete of concrete things" (113). It is that "strange reality, language, which makes the operation called abstraction possible," which is why "all those who speak make 'natural' use of abstraction" (112) . Notwithstanding the repeated assertions in Initiation of the plurality of practices, as well as of the determining role of the labor process in a fully social practice of abstraction, this anthropological "detour" could be seen as a volatile refunctioning, within a staunchly anti-humanist project, of the very theoretical humanisms, or philosophical anthropologies, that Althusser had famously sought to cast out of Marxism. That Althusser is willing to run this risk is made patent by his assertion that humans are "by nature . . . ideological animal[s]" (228)-a thesis that not only gives a kind of anthropological imprimatur to the mechanism of ideological interpellation of individuals into subjects famously detailed in "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" (and the longer manuscript on reproduction from which it was extracted), but signals the pessimistic (or better, realist) inflection that Althusser wishes to give to the Gramscian idea that everyone is an intellectual or philosopher, an idea that insistently shadows Althusser's wrestling with philosophy and non-philosophy in the 1970s. It is perhaps unsurprising that the thesis of the eternity of ideology would thus find itself in a sense "naturalized" in the partial convertibility of the argument according to which human beings (as linguistic animals, among other things) have always lived in abstraction, and the argument that they have always lived in ideology. Yet we should also note that the thesis of an immemorial abstraction consubstantial with the social life of human beings is also a quintessentially polemical thesis against another philosophical anthropology-the one through which modern philosophy sublimated and consolidated the juridical ideology of the propertied subject and his bourgeois state: the state of nature, with its myth of "transparency," grounded on an empiricism that fantasizes a passive unity of the abstract and the concrete in individual experience.
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We will return below to the question of whether this theory of abstraction, in its flirtation with philosophical anthropology, is compatible with Althusser's search for a modality of abstraction specific to a new practice of Marxist philosophy.
9 Before tackling what is arguably the central stake of Initiation, namely the effort to delimit the forms of abstraction specific to philosophy, in view of defining a Marxist counter-practice of philosophy-indeed, not so much an anti-philosophy as a counter-philosophy-it is worth pausing on what Althusser presents as the basic lineaments of his analysis of abstraction, as presented in two crucial pages (312-13) that begin, tellingly, with the quasi-anthropological thesis that "people live in abstraction, under abstract relations that command all their practices." Or, as he argues earlier in Initiation, in a particularly lucid and powerful formula: "Social appropriation of the concrete proceeds by way of the domination of abstract relations" (120). The plurality of such practices dictates the conclusion that "abstraction in general does not exist," only "different types and levels of abstraction, depending on the different practices and their different types" (312). In a dialectical wordplay reminiscent of Marx's 1857 introduction to the Grundrisse, Althusser contends that there are instead "abstractions in general" which in turn command the plurality of practices, influencing their specific abstractions. These general abstractions are "social relations: relations of production, circulation, and distribution; political relations, and ideological relations-all of them relations organized in accordance with (ordonnés aux) class relations and the class struggle" (312). It is not only this grounding in class and class struggles that gives Althusser's theory of abstraction its materialist edge, but the fact that he considers these relations to be abstract only to the extent that they are "rooted in the materiality of social practices," only to the extent that "they make possible the final production of the concrete" (313). As he concludes, introducing his abiding concern with temporal heterogeneity into the conflictual dynamics of abstraction, but also recuperating the "ethical" thrust of ancient materialism, and thus the practical humanism that should be the ultimate fruit of theoretical anti-humanism:
This gigantic cycle of social production, in the rhythms of its diverse rotations and in its complex entanglements, operates under the primacy of the concrete-real over the abstract, and therefore under the primacy of practice over theory. But at no moment in the cycle, however, can we observe a pure distinction between practice or the concrete on the one hand and theory or abstraction on the other. At each and every moment, all the abstract relations, including theoretical relations, exist only on condition that they are rooted in practice, in the concrete. It is the contradictions of this immense cycle which produce, in the form of class struggle, that which is called human history and makes this history human-makes it, that is, not a disembodied history, but one charged with heaviness, materiality, and finitude, with human suffering, discoveries, and joys. (313) The question of the relationship between theoretical abstraction and concrete practice-or perhaps given their irreducible plurality, it would be best to say practices-is also articulated in terms of a broad tripartition of the modalities of abstraction pertaining to practical know-how, the sciences, and philosophy. Practical knowledge, as I have already suggested, adds something to the concrete objects it deals with. The abstraction that is added to concrete multiplicity takes for Althusser the form of a generality, a term that he employs to denote the fact that this abstraction only bears upon a finite ensemble of objects under consideration. Therein lies the critical distinction between practical knowledge and scientific knowledge (connaissance pratique and connaissance scientifique). Whereas the former "applies generally to all observed cases, and to them alone," the latter bears instead on "directly abstract objects, which are, consequently, endowed with an abstraction that is no longer generality, but universality" (134). For Althusser, who notes his debt to Gaston Bachelard on these matters, the passage to scientific knowledge, here grasped in terms of modalities of abstraction, is a leap, a rupture; as it becomes capable of applying "new universal concepts" to "new universal objects" to produce and know "new abstract objects," science leaves behind the "limitation of observed cases" and attains a different level of concreteness, the "experimental concrete, the 'purified' concrete" (135). It is worth noting that in the manuscript of Initiation Althusser returns, for the purposes of conceptual and terminological clarification, to the theory of abstraction he had expounded in For Marx. In light of the aforementioned distinction between practical generality and scientific universality, what are we to make of the theory of the production of scientific knowledge in terms of the process whereby Generalities II (the abstractions and instruments of scientific research) operate upon Generalities I (the "raw" material of ideological preconceptions and outdated results) to produce Generalities III (new knowledges)? Shouldn't, say, Generalities II be rechristened Universalities I and Generalities III, Universalities II?
10 While recognizing the potential for perplexity, Althusser-notwithstanding his rather profound revisions to the overall approach of For Marx-defends the earlier terminology by insisting that generalities, which define not only practical knowledge but practical ideologies, remain present at all levels of the process of knowledge production. This permeation of the process of scientific knowledge production by generality can also be understood in terms of science's presupposition, in the practices through and over which it operates, of an "impressive layer of abstractions" (203). Contrary to a view whereby ambient practical abstractions are empty husks, devoid of knowledge, one must make it very clear that such abstractions are not empty, contrary to what ordinary usage of the word "abstraction" suggests. The opposite is true: they are full of defined knowledge obtained at the end of a long process, and their combination (assemblage) defines, not an empty space, but, to the contrary, a perfectly mapped space. This is the space in which the scientific event will occur: the scientific "fact" that will make new discoveries possible or call for a modification either of the researchers' working hypotheses or their experimental apparatus. (205) Science is always incomplete, unfinished, prey to the ambient pressures of ideology "which contaminates or can contaminate the way it posits scientific problems (or . . . can sometimes help it to posit them)" (211). This productive incompletion, which conditions the hard-won new knowledge about the "concrete-real" produced by the sciences, contrasts with philosophy's overarching modality of abstraction, which could be seen as driven by the imperative of completion at all costs. By comparison with the generalities of practical knowledge and the universalities of scientific knowledge, philosophy-which of course produces no knowledge whatsoever-is for Althusser first and foremost a practice of totalization. Totalization will in many respects provide the key to philosophy's specific ideological, and therefore political, function. What does it mean to say that while practice generalizes, and science universalizes, philosophy instead totalizes?
Like every other variety of abstraction in Althusser's account, the abstractions of philosophy are not subtractive-removing concreteness from the real, draining the richness of experience-but additive. But philosophy makes a strange addition, or more precisely a strange supplement, devoid of content but replete with consequences. In the terms rehearsed by the earlier Être marxiste en philosophie, philosophy is a machine that produces nothing, 11 but this nothing, as a unifying supplement crowning and consolidating the dominant ideology, can at times prove crucial. That is why "philosophy presents this paradox of being at one and the same time completely useless (nulle), as imaginary speculation, and concretely very useful."
12 Accordingly, a "scientific" theory of philosophy requires taking seriously what we could call philosophy's redoubling-act, its supplementation of the concepts and results of science, or the outcomes of other practices, with its own empty but powerful truths 13 -a supplementation that Althusser considers vital at certain junctures in the historical process of social domination.
Philosophy does not deal with a finite set of observable cases, nor does it directly cognize, through experimental apparatuses, universal (which is to say determinately unlimited) objects. Instead, at least in its dominant idealist orientation, it wishes to think the Whole, the All. The paradox of philosophy is that to encompass the whole it must supplement it with that which does not exist, with the nothing, a void, in the form of the possible. To think the whole requires thinking " 'things' that do not exist" (143). The prestidigitation peculiar to the philosopher is to surpass the sciences and practices by weaving an all-encompassing horizon of thought, or, better, of the thinkable, out of nothing. Althusser's theory of abstraction as additional to the real-concrete comes to intersect with his enduring hostility to a Hegelian-Marxism orbiting around the category of totality, here also encompassing, as a polemical foil, the project of Jean-Paul Sartre's Critique of Dialectical Reason, in which the very notion of "totalization" played a key part.
A materialist orientation in philosophy will turn out to involve a whole series of de totalizations of philosophy. First and foremost, perhaps, it will require assuming the fact that there are "absolute losses," "failures without appeal," that in the world "suffering and evil can exist with nothing to make up for them, with no compensation in this world or anywhere else" (76). At an ethical level, such a materialism requires learning from the "great tragic theme of popular wisdom and materialist philosophy," which calls for facing death without fear but also without any consolatory illusions, without a thinking of redemption. Indeed, if there is an ethic to be drawn from these pages it A materialist orientation in philosophy will turn out to involve a whole series of detotalizations of philosophy.
involves thinking a fully corporeal, worldly tragedy without resignation. Such a tragic materialism is intimately entangled with the question of abstraction, in its most everyday ideological reality, namely as that religious or ideological transcendence that provides the corrupting consolation of suffering, its sublimation into a network of beliefs designed to keep suffering bodies in their places. This is a materialism that consequently must confront that which otherwise haunts the bad faith and discomfited consciousness of idealist philosophy. Namely, the "outside" of non-philosophy, or better, of nonphilosophers. Not just the "blue-collar worker, the peasant, the office-worker," or the "manager, the civil servant, the doctor" (43), invoked at the very beginning of Initiation, but also everyone and everything that (idealist) philosophy has "neglected, rejected, censored, or abandoned" (100): "above all," as Althusser's anti-philosophical litany repeats, matter, labor, the body, woman, the child, madness, prisoners; "above all, the Barbarians for the Greeks and the 'wogs' (métèques) or 'foreigners' or 'natives' (indigènes) for us; above all, state power and all its apparatuses of coercion and 'persuasion,' hidden away in seemingly 'neutral' institutions, the family, the School System, the Health Care system, the administration and the political constitution; above all, class struggle, above all, war. No more than that" (101). When philosophy, as a practice of totalization, tries to obliterate any outside, and thus to become a "pure outside" (260-61), it is on and behind the backs of these "others"-the protagonists of a hitherto unexplored "History of NonPhilosophy" (100).
14 Materialism will also mean accepting the preponderance of ineluctable contingency in human affairs, the Epicurean deviations, the clinamen, which are such an obsessive presence in Althusser's writings. This is a detotalization in the domains of time, space, and causality. It is also a detotalization in the order of meaning, in keeping with the fundamental materialist lesson according to which "there exist meaningless questions" (64), which implies that philosophy's totalizing will is doomed and delusional. This is not merely a theoretical assertion, but a practical and ethical one. As Althusser enjoins his reader: "Why not frankly admit that the surest condition for acting in the world, modifying its course, and, accordingly, investing it with meaning through work, knowledge, and struggle, is to admit that the World has no Meaning (no pre-established meaning fixed by an all-powerful Being, who is a pure fiction)?" (69).
A world without meaning, over against a philosophical world in which cosmos is suffused with logos, is one in which there is no origin, only beginnings (commencements). This critical Epicurean distinction (66) 15 is of utmost importance when it comes to approaching that non-philosophical study (or perhaps "science") of philosophy that is a precondition for "being a Marxist in philosophy." While the polemical typology of abstraction I outlined above is certainly a major component in Althusser's elaboration of a Marxist practice of philosophy, just as important is a confrontation not only with philosophy's myths of origin but with other historical and historical-materialist accounts of philosophy's emergence. As we shall see shortly, philosophy's inception, its modality of abstraction, and its ideological function will form a kind of knot, indeed a conjunction, exemplarily represented in the figure of Plato, under whom it can be said, to use one of Althusser's favorite expressions, that philosophy "takes" (prend), like mayonnaise. Though Althusser does not explicitly confront specific historical narratives of philosophy's beginning, he explicitly identifies three candidates for explaining the ancient Greek emergence of philosophy. 16 What is particularly significant for our purposes, and shows the cohesion of Althusser's discourse in Initiation, is that all three involve modalities of abstraction antecedent to philosophy. In other words, even before sifting through the options, Althusser thinks that a (historical) materialist account of philosophy's beginning-an account that strips it of the privilege and autonomy of an origin-must look for a practice of abstraction that preceded and conditioned philosophical abstraction. These candidates are money, democracy, and science. Note that though Althusser will lay great emphasis on the function of philosophy in the (ideological) class struggle-to which we will turn in a moment-his discussion of available historical explanations for philosophy's beginning (rather than its function) does not start from class, from an organic bond between philosophy and class domination, but from the antecedence of real abstractions. Unfortunately, before Althusser advances his own preferred candidate-science, unsurprisingly-he only briefly indicates the reasons why historians may have turned to money and democracy. The first would stem from the idea that it was the role of money in market exchanges that provided an example of abstraction that inspired philosophers. Shades of the Marxist arguments advanced by George Thomson and Alfred Sohn-Rethel-and more recently reprised by Richard Seaford-could be discerned in these lines, though Althusser gives no inkling as to the complexity of those derivations, and, some affinities aside, we cannot see him as consciously engaging with the theory of "real abstraction."
17 As an alternative to money's conditioning of philosophy's inception, Althusser briefly considers democracy, taken by some historians (unfortunately, he does not name any sources here either) as providing the model, in its institutional rules and emphasis on the confrontation of perspectives, for philosophy's own abstraction. Now, though Althusser does not refute either of these positions-nor is it clear that he could, given that he seems relatively indifferent here to the detail of historical argument and controversy, engaging instead in what we could provocatively term a transcendental (materialist) deduction-he does indicate that they share with his own approach a common conviction, namely that the beginning of philosophy, and its relation to other practices, is to be sought in abstraction. But the abstraction that occasions philosophy is not to be found in the quantifications of coinage or in political equality, but Even before sifting through the options, Althusser thinks that a (historical) materialist account of philosophy ' s beginning-an account that strips it of the privilege and autonomy of an origin-must look for a practice of abstraction that preceded and conditioned philosophical abstraction. These candidates are money, democracy, and science.
in science, or rather in Greek geometry as "the first true science to have surged up in the history of human culture" (87). 18 Althusser's story has a hero and a villain, Thales and Plato. With Thales "everything changed":
People began to reason in a completely different way, about other objects. They stopped observing combinations of concrete numbers and transformations of concrete figures in order to reason about abstract objects, considered as such: pure numbers and pure figures, abstracted from their content or concrete representations of them. (88) To use the terminology we already encountered above, this is a leap from generality to universality. But it is not just a rupture with practical knowledge; it is a rupture with a different kind of generality, the ideological generality of religion. Like the demonstrations of mathematics, religion too argued that it could see not with the eyes of the body but with those of the soul, except that its conception of the soul was not the integrally rational, impersonal one that oversaw the upsurge of geometry.
19 But religion alone was powerless to stem what Althusser, again in a Bachelardian vein, sees as the profoundly subversive character of scientific mathesis, the social upheaval it threatened. In Althusser's narrative-which is here alas devoid of any substantial evidence or even of a number of steps in his deduction-the birth of scientific (which is to say truly abstract) mathematics threatened the unity of dominant ideas, the ideological (and therefore, in the last instance, class) cohesion of ancient Greek society. Philosophy owes its "irreversible historical existence" to Plato, who founded philosophy by inventing the form through which it could neutralize scientific or mathematical subversion. "What did Plato do?" Althusser asks. And he responds: "He thought up the 'unheard-of ' project of restoring the unity of the dominant ideas undermined by the advent of mathematics" (90). 20 In other words, philosophy does not begin in wonder but in reaction. And this reaction, capable of reunifying and reproducing the internal unity of a dominant ideology threatened with fragmentation by the new abstract knowledge heralded by geometry, is predicated on "gaining control over" mathematics, "subordinating it" to (Plato's) philosophy and forcing it to step back in line, into the "order . . . of the moral and political values that mathematics had momentarily threatened, or might threaten" (91).
21 Two years before Initiation, in the manuscript of its earlier incarnation, Être marxiste en philosophie, Althusser had advanced a crucial feature of philosophy's capture and neutralization of mathe matics: philosophy brings mathematical science back into line by refunctioning the forms of abstraction first introduced into human culture by geometry as the first science. This is how Althusser provocatively interprets the inscription over the gate of Plato's Academy, to mean that the philosopher must arm himself with the abstractions of mathematics to stem the subversion heralded by the matheme and to reproduce the unity of ideology.
Thus, philosophy owes mathematics the idea of pure objects and demonstrations, which are "abstract, rigorous, exhaustive, and objective, which is to say universal."
22 It also owes it the notion (which is of course affirmed by Althusser himself, potentially undermining the primacy of practice he declares elsewhere) that there is a break between practical and scientific knowledge, a break that it is philosophy's task, for the sake of the state, to manage-so that it will not mutate into a full-blown crisis. All of Plato-the theory of ideas, the opposition of knowledge and opinion, and so on-is based on the break that the "first science" represents. In a sense, this is because all of Plato is an attempt to control and in a way to "sublate" this break, in a profoundly inventive but also profoundly reactive dialectic. Philosophy, in its idealist Platonist matrix, is thus a reactive invention: the displacement of (the ideological functions of ) religion onto the plane of pure (abstract) rationality. It draws from these sciences its "form, the abstraction of its categories, and the demonstrativeness of its reasoning," as a pure reasoning directly carried out on "abstract" objects; but its function is an ideological one, a mandate and a service delegated, explicitly or otherwise, by the dominant class. 23 If we look at matters closely, Althusser contends, the advent of mathematics is not a neutral development, but "the solution to a crisis in a world in crisis, which was not ready to 'digest' it-or rather, which it tore somewhere at a point sensible to its ideological resistance. Philosophy can then be thought as the retort and the redemption of this menace, as the 'patching up' (ravaudage) of this tear in the unity of the fabric of dominant ideology."
24 Philosophy-in its inaugural Platonic, dialectical form-is the urgent invention of a form of abstraction capable of using the potentially subversive abstractions of mathematics to restore, or even reinvent, the ideological unity that those very abstractions had shaken. That is why the gate of the Academy read, "Let no one ignorant of geometry enter here."
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We can see here how, having contrasted his derivation of philosophy's beginning, the inception of its sui generis form of abstraction, with its two most prominent rivals (the political-economic abstraction of money, and the political abstraction of democratic procedure), Althusser in the end distances himself, by his focus on ideological practice in class struggle, from that approach (most evident in Sohn-Rethel's project), which sees the distinctiveness of a Marxian approach to philosophy as residing in its capacity to correlate (philosophical) form to (social) form, where the latter is to be understood as the (unconscious) form of a practice. The staggered gigantomachia between Thales and Plato, in the shadow of the waning powers of religion and a social crisis exacerbated by the advent of science, speaks instead of a determination of philosophy that is political, conflictual, and in a sense functional or instrumental-as the repeated evidence of its strategy of suture, its "patching up," suggests. We should also note here that whereas the Althusser of For Marx and Reading Capital could be seen as presenting the demarcation between science and ideology as the principal stake of philosophy, his emphasis on the role of science in the beginning of philosophy is combined in these pages with the assertion that other abstractive and ideological practices, in their specific and irreducible plurality, can also condition philosophy's operations. 26 Thus, contrary to what one may have gleaned from the centrality of the demarcation of science and ideology both to "high Althusserianism" and to Althusser's contribution to the Marxist debate on the beginning of philosophy, Initiation suggests that in the modern and contemporary periods, philosophy's fate is primarily bound not to science but to what he terms juridical ideology. This conviction was of course at the heart of his unpublished manuscript on reproduction, where the question of the current stakes of Marxist philosophy required a long and patient detour through law and the state, in their reproductive articulation to the mode of production. One of the peculiarities of Initiation is that the question of law, and in particular that of the subject of property, is broached at what we could call a quasi-anthropological level, in conjunction with the discussion of the abstractive powers native to language use. Here law intervenes in the demonstration of how every concrete, immediate, bodily experience is predicated on the existence of social abstractions, abstract relations. Though we can say that there is an "appropriation" of the concrete that operates not through language but through the body (as may be argued by an ontology or anthropology of labor), for the act of appropriation to be socially communicable it must combine speech and possession. One must be able to say, Althusser suggests, "this is my woman, this is my bread, this object is my horse or my tools" (115). In uncharacteristically Hegelian language (which not by accident follows shortly upon evocation of the Phenomenology's pioneering dialectical deconstruction of sense-certainty), Althusser will say that what is lacking from a purely corporeal conception of appropriation is thus "social, public recognition of the act of appropriation of the concrete" (115). Even more strikingly, Althusser appears to be suggesting that a social recognition of private property-whether tacit or taking the explicit form of property rights-is a precondition of social life. 27 Long before the apotheosis of the juridical ideology of possessive individualism, the state of nature and the legal subject, we would thus have the social communication and recognition of possessive rights as a precondition for living in common. As Althusser writes:
The act of physical, bodily appropriation has, in some sort, to be redoubled by a sanction that passes by way of the detour of a particular language, the language of law (droit), which publicly affirms, before all men, that this woman is well and truly his (not some other man's), that this horse is well and truly his, and so on.
Even the most "concrete" sort of appropriation thus has to have the social sanction of the language of law, that is to say, of an abstract system of relations. (116) As I have intimated above, it is noteworthy that Althusser finds himself obliged, in order to produce a multilayered theory of abstraction(s) in which to place philosophy, to advance these kinds of quasi-anthropological theses and categories (with their blatant, and one imagines conscious, gendering). In the process the modern specificity of juridical ideology, crucial to the composition and reproduction of bourgeois ideology tout court, seems oddly undermined by giving it this quasi-transcendental standing (an analogous short circuit could perhaps be discerned in Althusser's reliance on the religious scene of interpellation to elucidate the operations of modern state ideology). Althusser will not, however, seek to derive modern juridical ideology from the a-, proto-or prehistorical figure of a language of right, but to place it at the crux of capitalist ideology.
Vaulting from ancient philosophy to modern philosophy, Initiation will suggest that whereas philosophy was born in the parasitic invention of forms of abstraction capable of "patching up" the rupture caused by mathematics, modern and contemporary philosophy exists under a very different social mandate, one that is determined by the juridical ideology of the subject of rights. The real, practical abstractions of law turn out to be the defining factors in (idealist) philosophy's services to the class struggle (of the bourgeoisie). There is an irony here, inasmuch as the two "real abstractions" dismissed as occasioning philosophy's commencement-money and democracy-are conjoined in a legal subject that is a subject of commodity-exchange and political rights, a bourgeois (or wage laborer) and a citizen, at once.
Whereas Platonic philosophy totalized and subordinated mathematics, largely replacing the functions of religion and engaging in that quintessential ideological move that Althusser nicely terms "the transfer or displacement of domination" (225)-itself necessary for the paramount task of ideological unification-modern idealist philosophy shores up the abstract social forms of law, in their centrality to the reproduction of bourgeois rule. "Juridical ideology" is grounded in the form of the "juridical relation," which consolidates the social relations of production ("real" abstractions in their own right). For this ideology, on which all of bourgeois society rests, "every man is a subject of right, master and possessor of his body, his will, his freedom, his property, his acts, etc." (to the exclusion, naturally, of the "objects" of non-philosophy-the mad, the barbarian, the indigenous, the infant, and so on). While as a universally recognized form, the juridical ideology of the legal subject already enacts a potent unification of practices, reproducing the conditions for class rule and exploitation, there is still the need of a supplement, of a "redoubling"-of a way to unify unification, so to speak, thereby warding off the challenges to bourgeois dominance and hegemony. In modernity, philosophy is given the "historical mission," according to Althusser, of "universalizing this [legal] form" (357) using that practice of adjustment or welding (ajustement) that Althusser so often returns to in these pages, to articulate ideologies and practices into a cohesive unity-totalizing the whole, producing nothing, and making domination possible. 28 Althusser's description of philosophy's modern mission is worth quoting, especially as it ties his insistence on abstraction to the critique of the category of the subject which is the linchpin of his theoretical anti-humanism. The theoretical delegation of the class struggle to philosophy takes the following guise:
Philosophy must therefore, as a matter of priority, take this form (the subject form) and no other for its raw material and work on it to make it utilizable in every area of social practice. It must make it abstract enough to serve every useful purpose and in all possible cases; it must confer upon it the modalities required by each local or regional ideology; it must, finally, derive from it the higher abstractions that will bring about unity and guarantee this unity. The philosophy machine may not produce anything, but it does not turn idly. The supplements it engenders, in its "theoretical laboratory of hegemony," 29 are not surplus to the requirements of social reproduction; they are the requirements of surplus. Law itself, as Balibar notes, demands "the 'functional' necessity of an ideological supplement of effectivity."
30 While, as Sibertin-Blanc insightfully explains, each ideological apparatus already enacts its own unification and the recognition of the agents subjected to it, "philosophical abstraction intervenes by operating a superunification (sur-unification) of ideologies themselves (religious, scientific, juridical, moral, political . . .), under the dominance of a particular ideology. For philosophy may have no object ('in the sense in which a science has an object'), but it does indeed have a material (matière): the regional ideology that has been made determinant by the practices and struggles of the dominant class."
31
In modernity, this determinant ideology is the juridical one, as attested by modern philosophy's efforts to sublimate and stabilize categories such as Will, Property (Properties, the Proper), Representation, Person, Thing, but above all, Subject.
32
Althusser had already explored this predicament of philosophy in Être marxiste. There, having stated that philosophy's patching-up labors, aimed at the ideological tear caused by the upsurge of geometry, showed its "incontestable ideological function," Althusser suggests a transformation in philosophy's place within the "topics" of ideological domination. Inasmuch as there is no practice except under an ideology, every situation of class domination demands, as a "political task" in the ideological class struggle, the unification of local and regional ideologies under a set of guiding ideas, a precondition for the establishment of the unity of the dominant ideology, a unity necessary "to aid the dominant class to unify itself, and to subject the dominant class by absorbing the dangerous elements of its ideology."
33 This co-optation of the practices and the ideologies of the dominated in their own exploitation (distantly analogous to the use of mathematical form to subordinate mathematics to philosophy) is for Althusser a distinctive trait of bourgeois domination, which regularly strives to have its objectives carried out by the very people it exploits, the political practice of the bourgeoisie being based on the principle that one must " [utilize] to the full the forces of the popular masses it dominates by dominating them through state repression and the state ideology" (273). Or, as he also puts it, the very secret of ideological struggle is "to domesticate one's adversary by stealing his language" (342).
But philosophy is not, like religious and political ideologies before it, the regional ideology that directly fulfills the work of "super-unification." Rather, as I have already suggested, its participation in the ideological work of reproduction is, in Althusser's eyes, The philosophy machine may not produce anything, but it does not turn idly. The supplements it engenders, in its " theoretical laboratory of hegemony, " are not surplus to the requirements of social reproduction; they are the requirements of surplus.
bound to the determinant regional ideology in the bourgeois mode of production: juridical ideology. It is the latter, and not philosophy, which was the protagonist in the struggle to achieve the unity of bourgeois ideology. Using the forms of abstraction it was able to appropriate and re-function from the sciences, philosophy was then able to develop the abstractions generated by the liberal bourgeois ideology of law and right. As Althusser explains in Être marxiste:
In the secular work of the constitution and thus unification of the dominant bourgeois ideology, it is juridical ideology that was determinant, and philosophy which was dominant. At least since the first fifty years of the nineteenth century, juridical ideology furnished the master ideas indispensable to the constitution of liberal bourgeois ideology, and it was around them that the work of unification took place. Philosophy was then able to play its proper role: by theoretically elaborating questions and answers, which is to say theses and categories that, on the one hand, could be the expression of this juridical ideology, and, on the other, could work on the ideas of existing ideologies to transform them in the direction of their unification.
34
We can now ask: Is there a philosophy of, or even for, the dominated? For those nonphilosophers who are neither the subjects or even agents of philosophy, but its censured or disavowed "objects," "others," or "outside"? The first thing to be noted is that there is significant terminological and conceptual ambivalence in Être marxiste en philosophie and Initiation à la philosophie pour les non-philosophes. In his 1957 talk "Chacun peut-il philosopher?" (Can everyone be a philosopher?), usefully appended by the editor to Être marxiste, Althusser had proposed that the only proper way of being a Marxist in philosophy is to produce a historical science of philosophy, grounded in historical materialism. But in these treatises from the 1970s, he also stresses repeatedly that, as the moving battlefield between dominant idealist and subaltern materialist tendencies, philosophyshorn of science's history of real problems (and results) and permeated by questions that only "feign" looking for answers-doesn't really have a history.
35 After a fashion, Althusser's conundrum is the one that Marxism always faces when it comes to the history of ideologies and superstructures. What is it, as Marx had intimated, to write the history of a thing without history? Or, in Althusser's terms, a "pseudo-history" of repetitions?
36 It is not clear that Althusser ever resolves the contradictions between the conjunctural history that governs his understanding of philosophy as conditioned by events in other practices of abstraction, and by the particular configurations of ideological class struggle, on the one hand, and philosophy's timeless, ideological "eternity," on the other. Notwithstanding certain anti-philosophical moments, in which he appears to suggest a simple exit from philosophy, or a position strictly outside of it, the more Althusser asserts the necessary permeation of practice, including scientific practice, by ideology and abstraction, the more he is conscious that simply stepping outside the "circle" of philosophy is impossible.
37
In this respect, neither the expression "scientific theory of philosophy" nor "Marxist philosophy," used in these manuscripts of the 1970s, can be satisfactory. The first because of the adjective: in what sense are these treatises meant to embody a "scientific" approach? To the extent that they are grounded in the "science" of historical materialism? But the derivation of philosophy's beginning seems largely indifferent to studies of the mode of production, social relations and class struggles in ancient Greece, and the modern detour through juridical ideology likewise retains only the broadest didactic outlines of liberal bourgeois thought and practice, leaving laws and rights massively underdetermined under the figures of Law and Right. Moreover, Althusser's approach-I will not say his method, hostile as he is to that bad abstraction, and to the whole idea of dialectical laws as the basis of a specifically Marxist method (378-79) 38 -bears little if any resemblance to the model for the scientific production of knowledge that he had laid out in his theory of Generalities in For Marx, and reprised in these texts. That is why I spoke somewhat tentatively of his "quasi"-anthropological arguments regarding the abstraction of language: in the end these are, to use Althusser's own critical distinction, not scientific problems or concepts, but philosophical questions, theses, and categories. However much Althusser, by way of a kind of conditioned rhetorical reflex, may still pay tribute to the emancipatory orientation of a Marxist science, what these pages produce is not a "scientific theory of philosophy," but a philosophical theory of philosophy. But neither do they generate a "Marxist philosophy," a term that is ultimately attached here to those Marxist epistemologies and ontologies about which Althusser is so scathing, viewing them as so many unwitting repetitions-often in subordination to the ideologies of Soviet state power, or their national communist party surrogates-of the totalizations that characterize idealist philosophy. This is the sense in which Marxist philosophy may be, in Althusser's corrosive phrase, "a final bourgeois illusion." 39 When all is said and done one can only be a Marxist in philosophy-this "universal form of intervention-without-intervention"
40
-by forging a new practice of philosophy, a new way of inhabiting a philosophical field dominated by the mandated service, the bourgeois delegation, of producing and reproducing the ideological unity of domination. Having displaced the terrain of the line struggles between materialism and idealism onto the complex landscape of abstraction, 41 it becomes even clearer that this practice cannot be another philosophy-in the sense of an alternative totalization, a Marxist ontology or epistemology 42 -but neither can it be a scientific theory produced from some position outside that of philosophy. It requires above all rejecting that totalizing and supplemental modality of abstraction that characterizes idealist philosophy, and the full assumption-beyond the "feint" of producing knowledge 43 -that its practice is one that depends not on the production of knowledge, truths, or concepts, but on the polemical generation When all is said and done one can only be a Marxist in philosophy by forging a new practice of philosophy, a new way of inhabiting a philosophical field dominated by the mandated service, the bourgeois delegation, of producing and reproducing the ideological unity of domination.
of theses and categories in partisan engagement with the plurality of practices, and with the class struggles that crisscross them. 44 A philosophical proposition, Althusser will write in Initiation, is an "active proposition" (317), producing an effect of existence, making something move from nothingness to being. It is from this productive and polemical image of thought that derive the army of martial metaphors that populate the pages of these texts, especially Être marxiste-sometimes, one suspects, to make up for the inevitable absence of content that accompanies a general account of what can only be singular, conjunctural confrontations (once we have abandoned the bourgeois illusion of a materialist ontology or epistemology). In this conception of philosophical practice we leave theories of knowledge behind and consider the "active and acting propositions" of philosophy as so many "acts of theoretical war."
45 Not so much an anti-philosophy as a counter-philosophy, then. 46 But what happens to abstraction in this mobile Kampfplatz, eternal in its division between camps, singular in its clashes?
>>
It is precisely by combining the deeply political character of philosophy's relation to other practices of abstraction (from practical knowledge to religion, from science to law) with his enduring insight about the clash of materialism and idealism that Althusser can propose a rich idea of philosophy beyond its self-image as a kind of sovereign contemplation. Philosophy is not just a conjunctural play of theses and categories, universalizing the abstractions of the sciences to shore up the "abstract domination" of the bourgeoisie, and totalizing possible and existent beings; its active propositions have "less to do with knowledge of these entities than with the conflicts of which they may be the stakes." According to Althusser, that is why every philosophy (let us not hesitate to go that far) is haunted by its opposite; that is why idealism is haunted by materialism, just as materialism is haunted by idealism, for every philosophy reproduces in itself, in some sort, the conflict in which it finds itself engaged outside itself. (158) Beneath philosophy's totalizing abstractions, there is thus a more basic, if less lofty form of abstraction, what Althusser terms an active and polemical abstraction that characterizes philosophy as a kind of preemptive and preventive warfare. This is the truly "strange" abstraction of philosophy, which seems always to involve a "previous conflict," concerning "the place, meaning and function of these entities, a conflict which commands philosophy from without and which philosophy has to bring within itself in order to exist as philosophy" (159). But does a materialist practice of philosophy exhaust itself in this largely internecine conflict, this civil war over abstractions with its idealist foe, the one always ready to put it to work to shore up social order-much as colonial powers employ their comprador classes, in Althusser's jarring analogy? 47 Here, as in every struggle of materialism and idealism, there would inevitably emerge a number of asymmetries, chief among them perhaps that the preventive warfare of idealism would have as its counter-part different tactics and strategies, ones mirroring the balance of ideological forcesmaterialist enclaves, red bases, double agents, popular wars, mass desertions, and so on. The history of philosophy would turn out to resemble a history of counterinsurgency.
But perhaps a different practice of abstraction, another way of being a Marxist in philosophy, might demand something rather different, namely a way of articulating the active and polemical abstractions of philosophy to the ways in which communist political practice seeks to undo, refunction, or abolish the practical, ideological abstractions of capitalism-not least property, money, and democracy. To the degree that "proletarian political practice" demands a "dialectic of mutual unification and transformation between the objective situation and the revolutionary forces engaged in combat," between transformation of the situation and self-transformation, what role can philosophy have in elucidating what Althusser calls a "new concrete abstraction" (284), which relates the agents of communist politics and a social world in transition in a manner alien to the abstractions of liberal politics? Among the many questions that Althusser's laboratory has bequeathed to us is perhaps this: Is it possible to be a communist in philosophy? In other words, can a materialist (practice of ) philosophy extricate itself from its combats against idealism (against its own idealism, too) and contribute to the theory and practice of a transition that requires dismantling and displacing the practical abstractions of bourgeois society, to give rise to communist practices that will have their own abstract relations, their own practical ideologies? Could such a communist philosophy, committed to the detotalization of idealism, relate to such new practices in ways that do not reproduce the bourgeois imperative of super-unification, and thus the historical complicity of philosophers with the state? Could it become a philosophy that doesn't "reproduce the form of the state within itself" (369)? In order not to be the feigned questions of philosophy, such queries might require the patience and detour of listening to non-philosophy and non-philosophers. As Althusser said:
Idealist philosophers speak for everyone and in everyone's stead. They think, in fact, that they are in possession of the Truth about everything. Materialist philosophers are much less talkative: they know how to shut up and listen to people. They do not think that they are privy to the Truth about everything. They know that they can become philosophers only gradually, modestly, and that their philosophy will come to them from outside. So they shut up and listen. (53) 48 Can a materialist (practice of) philosophy extricate itself from its combats against idealism (against its own idealism, too) and contribute to the theory and practice of a transition that requires dismantling and displacing the practical abstractions of bourgeois society, to give rise to communist practices that will have their own abstract relations, their own practical ideologies?
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Page number references to Initiation à la philosophie pour les non-philosophes will be given parenthetically in the body of the essay. All translations of Initiation are by G. M. Goshgarian, to be published as Philosophy for Non-Philosophers (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016) .
2
See especially the prologue to Althusser, Être marxiste en philosophie, "L'âne de Groucha" (45-55), the delirious mise-en-scène of an improbable symposium involving the greatest philosophers in history; or, in the same text, the spirited envisaging of communism in the wake of Derrida's Margins of Philosophy: "The margin is also the beach, the one upon which everyone will disembark to sun themselves when they will have finally traversed the terrible waters of socialism on the ship of the dictatorship of the proletariat" (213). All translations from the French are my own, unless noted otherwise.
3
See Stuart Hall, "Marx's Notes on Method: A 'Reading' of the '1857 Introduction.' "
4
"Cremonini, Painter of the Abstract" is published in Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays. I have drawn on For Marx and the essay on Cremonini in "The Open Secret of Real Abstraction" and "Materialism without Matter," respectively.
5
See Althusser, The Humanist Controversy, 3-10.
6
"We are thus naturally led to conceive of social practices, not as acts or simple activities, but as processes: that is, as a set of material, ideological, theoretical, and human (the agents) elements sufficiently well adapted to one another for their reciprocal action to produce a result that modifies the initial givens. We shall, then, use the word practice to designate a social process that puts agents into active contact with the real and produces results of social utility" (Initiation, 168; see also 163). See also Althusser, Être marxiste en philosophie, 75.
7
As Guillaume Sibertin-Blanc has perceptively noted in his preface to Initiation, this pluralization of practices-no longer limited to the triangle of science, politics and philosophy, with their Marxian "real" in production, but encompassing the full gamut of human activities, from everyday know-how to art and psychoanalysis-involves a "pluralization of the unity of theory and practice, a unity as variable as the differentials of abstraction that condition it each and every time, simultaneously impeded turning it into a simple identity" (preface to Initiation, 15). Althusser himself provides a striking metaphor for a dynamic and differential "unity" of theory and practice when he says that practice should be conceived by analogy with the balance weight (ballant) of a locomotive wheel, where practice is what instigates, communicates, and prolongs the movement of theory in a cycle or rather spiral of practice, theory and practice, or concreteabstract-concrete (Initiation, 285).
8
See chap. 6 of Initiation, "Le mythe de l'État de Nature" (149-59; "The Myth of the State of Nature" in this issue of diacritics), which would be deserving of an essay-length commentary in its own right, especially in terms of its relation to Althusser's writings on Rousseau.
9
I follow here Sibertin-Blanc's suggestion that the question of Marxism and philosophy for the Althusser of the second half of the 1970s can be encapsulated in the following question: "Can there exist a modality of abstraction specific to this new practice of philosophy?" (preface to Initiation, 31) 
Notes
14
In light of the way in which reception of Althusser continues to be conditioned by the caustic "parricide" carried out in Jacques Rancière's combative Althusser's Lesson, it is worth remarking that, along with the work of Michel Foucault, Althusser indicates Rancière's writing as a rare contemporary attempt at "writing a History of these non-philosophical 'objects' " (Initiation, 102, 102n2).
15 Note, though, the contrasting thesis in Althusser, Être marxiste en philosophie, whereby "for us materialists, philosophy has no beginning" (129).
16 Emphasizing philosophy's conditioning by scientific universality, Althusser will argue that as the passage from observation to reasoning on abstract objects, exemplified by Thales , did not occur in civilizations which nevertheless featured advanced practical knowledge and speculative discourses, the beginning of philosophy is an ancient Greek monopoly. For instance, "though empirical mathematics were very developed by the people of the Eastern Mediterranean basin, they were incapable of attaining theoretical form" (Initiation, 88, 87) . It is curious to note that, notwithstanding his largely incompatible theory of real abstraction, Alfred Sohn-Rethel's Intellectual and Manual Labor will also assert such a "civilizational" singularity for philosophy. Not so much peoples without history, but peoples without theory.
17 See, though, Jason Read's "The Pedagogical Detour" for a brief and acute contrast between the positions of Althusser and Sohn-Rethel on the reality of abstraction.
18 A more comprehensive reconstruction of Althusser's derivation of philosophy and its shifts would need above all to explore the considerably more "overdetermined" account advanced in the manuscript of Sur la reproduction, where it is the conjunction or encounter of events in the sciences and politics (meaning in class structures, class relations and the state) which explains a particular dominant form of philosophizing (e.g., the Cartesian conjuncture dominated by the conjunction of Galilean science, on the one hand, and the absolutist state and commercial law, on the other), as well as the overall periodization of philosophy. 20 It transcends the aims of this paper, but it is worth noting that this is exactly the opposite of what Alain Badiou has been suggesting for the past quarter of a century-albeit in the ambit of a common conviction regarding the Greek singularity of philosophy-as concerns the relation between the Platonic inception of philosophy and its mathematical condition. Commenting on the demarcation of philosophy in Althusser's Lenin and Philosophy, Badiou has affirmed that "every truly contemporary philosophy must set out from the singular theses according to which Althusser identifies philosophy," to wit the idea that it is a "separating activity," that it has no object, and that it "authorises a non-historicist perception of political events" (Metapolitics, 63, 62). As I hope to have shown, the definition of philosophy in Althusser's unpublished work of the second half of the 1970s raises some very different challenges for contemporary thought, especially by intensifying the anti-or counter-philosophical notes in the earlier, published work. For another approach to the relationship between Badiou and Althusser, in terms of the struggle against idealist philosophy and the challenge of articulating philosophy and science, see Bruno Bosteels, Alain Badiou, une trajectoire polémique, especially chap. 1, "Derrière le dos du philosophe."
21 In a later historical context, which we will touch upon in terms of the place of juridical ideology in Althusser's account, the modern philosophies of the state of nature will likewise have as their project and purpose to "cement the unity of the bourgeoisie" (Initiation, 157). 25 See also ibid., 302, on the "double position" of mathematics, both inaugural and subordinated.
26 See Goshgarian, preface to Être marxiste en philosophie, 31.
27 Though it largely transcends the concerns of this essay, it is worth noting the connection drawn by Althusser between the theory of knowledge and private property, under the aegis of the notion of the guarantee. For Althusser, the triumph of the theory of knowledge within philosophy is to be sought "in the history of juridical and political ideology. In effect, it is not by chance if the philosophical fortunes of the theory of knowledge coincide with the return of Roman law (droit romain), obviously as projected onto the present, and modified accordingly, by the birth and development of the capitalist mode of production in Western Europe. We spoke of philosophy's guarantee-function: one can only guarantee rights (droits). That is because the guarantee of a state of affairs (état de fait) is a matter of force, which, as Rousseau put it very well, 'does not make right' (ne fait pas droit), and it is always a question in philosophy of a theoretical guarantee, that is of the guarantee of these very particular facts that are rights, which only a foundation of right, and a legal reason (raison de droit), can guarantee. . . . This whole history of the guarantee, this long and painful conceptual history of the guarantee thus ends up, ludicrously, in the guarantee of private property. And with it, there also ends, in the same way, the whole long history of the guarantee of the property over things, the properties of things, the proper of things and of each and every one (le propre des choses et de chacun), and thus of the subject, whose hands were always clean and proper, since there is no bad subject, or if there is, there are always courts of law and insane asylums to welcome and reeducate him" (Althusser, Être marxiste en philosophie, .
28 "I would say that philosophy is comparable to an artisan's workshop, one in which a theoretical adjustor turns out parts made to measure to connect the various elements (more or less homogeneous, more or less contradictory) of the existing ideological forms in order to make them into the relatively unified ideology that the dominant ideology must be. . . . Of course, since it is not just a matter of unifying an ideology by producing interchangeable connecting joints, but also of unifying the parts to be connected, since this is the only efficient, economic solution, the work of the philosopher-adjustor consists in forging categories that are as universal as possible, capable of unifying the various domains of ideology under their theses" (Initiation, 
43
On the "feint" as a fundamental character of idealism, see ibid., 98.
44
We could also note that this detotalizing practice of philosophy, reflexive about its positional and polemical character, equally requires forsaking the illusion that philosophy has no "back" (ibid., 319), and listening to the "non-philosophical" individuals and practices that idealist philosophy treats as so much dark matter.
45 Ibid., 117. On this martial and agonistic image of philosophy, see Montag, Althusser and His Contemporaries, [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] 46 Sibertin-Blanc writes of "a counter-philosophical practice within philosophy" (preface to Initiation, 25).
47
In philosophy "something always remains of the positions of the adversary, it is in keeping with proper colonial method to leave the native chiefs in place: as the English method has shown, they know a lot better than the occupants how to exploit their own compatriots" (Althusser, Être marxiste en philosophie, 156).
48
There is a striking echo in these lines of the advice that Althusser had given to Maria Antonietta Macciocchi about how to run her campaign rallies in the subproletarian neighborhoods of Naples. See Macciocchi, Letters from inside the Italian Communist Party to Louis Althusser.
